# Community incident response guidelines Site [llms.txt](/es/llms.txt) --- This security policy applies to all projects under the [OpenTelemetry organization][gh-organization] on GitHub. Security vulnerabilities should be handled quickly and sometimes privately. The primary goal of this process is to reduce the total time users are vulnerable to publicly known exploits. The relevant OpenTelemetry repository maintainers, supported by the Security SIG and OpenTelemetry Technical Committee (TC), are responsible for responding to the incident including internal communication and external disclosure. ## Security model Repositories may document artifact-specific threat models in `THREAT_MODEL.md`. If an artifact's `THREAT_MODEL.md` explicitly specifies otherwise, it takes precedence over this section for that artifact. This section applies wherever the threat model does not specify otherwise. When assessing the urgency and importance of a security fix, confidentiality and integrity are our topmost concerns for all OpenTelemetry software artifacts. In contrast, we do not consider the default settings of OpenTelemetry software artifacts to be secure against availability attacks. We highly recommend not using insecure defaults where feasible. To ensure availability, users must require authentication for their endpoint communication following the guidance on the [Security section of our website](/docs/security/). Additionally, the OpenTelemetry project does not consider the following to be security vulnerabilities: - a denial of service attack by properly authenticated clients - availability-related attack to endpoints by properly authenticated clients These may still be considered bugs, and users can report them as such. When assessing availability-related impact, maintainers will also take into account the security policies of other projects (e.g. Prometheus) when assessing vulnerabilities against components that provide compatibility with those projects, as well as the level of asymmetry in terms of resource usage leveraged by the attack. ### Availability assessment Within the availability scope above, assess impact on the affected OTel artifact and, for SDKs and instrumentation, the application using it. - **Software vulnerabilities** let attacker-controlled input degrade or deny availability through a design or implementation weakness. Examples include crashes caused by faulty input handling, resource leaks, unsafe decompression or other asymmetric resource consumption, and bypassed or ineffective resource limits. - **Capacity and deployment issues** occur when telemetry volume or downstream failures exceed processing capacity, buffering, or retry budgets without exploiting a software weakness. Expected backpressure or telemetry drops under these conditions do not, by themselves, establish a vulnerability. Assess claimed failures of resource limits or tenant isolation against the artifact's supported use, configuration, and intended protections. Shared resources, unbounded fields, missing resource limits, linear resource growth with input size or volume, or missing per-tenant quotas alone do not establish a vulnerability. Use the [report requirements](#report-requirements) below to assess the available evidence and identify gaps. [MITRE CWE-400](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html) explains why resource consumption as an impact must be distinguished from its underlying weakness. ## Supported Versions The OTel project provides community support only for the last overall minor version: bug fixes are released either as part of the next minor version or as an on-demand patch version. Independent of which version is next, all patch versions are cumulative, meaning that they represent the state of our `main` branch at the moment of the release. For instance, if the latest version is 0.10.0, bug fixes are released either as part of 0.11.0 or 0.10.1. Security fixes are given priority and might be enough to cause a new version to be released. Each repository is entitled to establish their own complementary processes. The Security SIG in conjunction with the TC can advise in case clarifications are required. ## Reporting a Vulnerability ### Report requirements Assess findings against the [Security model](#security-model). Reports must include evidence supporting the suspected vulnerability. Provide the following details to the extent known, and identify any gaps: 1. **Affected component and configuration:** repository, package or artifact, affected versions or revisions (including released versions where applicable), relevant features, deployment, and required settings. 1. **Attacker capability:** the exact input under attacker control, access and privileges required, and any cooperation needed from another party. 1. **Reachable behavior:** the entry point and how that input reaches the affected operation. Include relevant code paths, dependency calls, and checks where known. 1. **Security consequence:** the missing or ineffective protection and concrete confidentiality, integrity, or availability impact. Identify whose data or resources are affected and any tenant or privilege boundary crossed. 1. **Evidence and existing protections:** a reproducer or substantiated explanation of reachability and impact, supported by code analysis or observed behavior. Describe relevant limits and protections and why they do not prevent the impact. Include supporting source locations where known. State assumptions and unresolved questions. 1. **Severity assessment:** a CVSS v4.0 Base score, `CVSS:4.0` vector, and rationale for each Base metric. Follow the [severity guidance](#severity) below. Code references must identify the reviewed revision. Distinguish verified facts from assumptions. Do not delay an initial report of a suspected vulnerability while gathering missing details, especially if it is already public or being actively exploited. Use the [private reporting methods](#reporting-methods), include the available evidence, and supplement it during assessment. Reports without supporting evidence may be closed if the reporter does not provide it after a request from Maintainers. A closed report may be reopened if supporting evidence is provided later. #### Severity Assess vulnerabilities using only the Base metrics from the [CVSS v4.0 specification](https://www.first.org/cvss/v4.0/specification-document) and [calculator](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/4.0). For general-purpose libraries, document reasonable worst-case usage assumptions. A library flaw reachable through network input is not necessarily a local attack. A required nondefault configuration alone does not justify `AT:P`. Assess dependencies through their use in OTel rather than copying their scores. Define the vulnerable system being scored. An SDK and its host application can form one vulnerable system; host application impact is not automatically subsequent-system impact. Distinguish exposure of telemetry from exposure of credentials or unrelated application data. ### Reporting Methods In order for the vulnerability reports to reach maintainers as soon as possible, the preferred way is to use the `Report a vulnerability` button on the `Security` tab in the respective GitHub repository. It creates a private communication channel between the reporter and the maintainers. For reporting security issues against the website, please report them at . If you are unable to or have strong reasons not to use the GitHub reporting workflow, please reach out to [security@opentelemetry.io](mailto:security@opentelemetry.io) and we will provide instruction on how to report the vulnerability. Reports should be acknowledged within 3 working days. **Please avoid reporting any vulnerabilities as a generic public "Issue" in GitHub.** Given the public visibility of GitHub issues, reporting a vulnerability as a GitHub issue would be public disclosure. If this is done accidentally or if you notice a vulnerability reported this way, please immediately re-report the vulnerability using "Report a vulnerability" and note the public disclosure as part of that report. You can ask GitHub to delete the issue but this shouldn't be considered a sufficient mitigation and the vulnerability should be considered publicly disclosed. ### Non-Public Vulnerabilities If a vulnerability appears to be not publicly known or disclosed, the repository maintainers will engage and the reporter is requested to honor an embargo period in which the vulnerability is keep private until a fix can be released and disclosed in an orderly manner. If the reporter has a need to disclose the vulnerability further, perhaps for a security conference or other obligation, they are asked to negotiate the disclosure date with the maintainers fixing the vulnerability. The repository maintainers will in any case do their best to move swiftly with the fix and release process. ### Publicly Known Vulnerabilities If you discover an unreported publicly disclosed/known vulnerability please IMMEDIATELY use the reporting methods above to inform the team about the vulnerability so they may start the patch, release and communication process. Please include any relevant information about current public exploitations of this vulnerability, if known, to help with scoring and prioritization. ## More Information For more information, please see the [Security SIG documentation](https://github.com/open-telemetry/sig-security/blob/main/security-response.md) on GitHub. [gh-organization]: https://github.com/open-telemetry